1 In 1990 the popular people's movement or the Jana Andolan led to the restoration of multiparty democracy. New constitution limited the monarchy's role, retained Nepal as a Hindu kingdom and paved the way for parliamentary system and grants fundamental rights. However, the radical left parties rejected the constitution ultimately launching people's war which is called Maoist movement. In the process, in 2001 King Birendra and his immediate families were massacred. The official investigation indicts crown prince Dipendra amid widespread speculation of a conspiracy. Birendra's younger brother Gyanendra took over as the monarch. A brief interlude of peace was observed with the ceasefire (brokered by India) which soon collapsed with the Maoist attack on the barracks of Nepal army. The King dissolved the government and declared emergency and deployed Nepal army and civil war intensified. The second Jana Andolan in 2006 lasted for 19 days of people's movement and King Gyanendra conceded the sovereignty to rest with the people. Consequently, the monarch was reduced to become a constitutional monarch and Nepal army was brought under civilian rule and the country was declared a secular republic. The political crisis still continues with frequent government changes fuelled by internal differences. In recent years, various factions of pro-India Madhesi parties are at loggerheads with the government alleging widespread discrimination. (See Jha, 2016) 4 search of democracy. Historically, Tundikhel played an important role as a space for religious, cultural, social, and political activism signifying Lefebvre's (1991) spaces of 'representation and representational space'. Since the abolition of the monarchy on 28 May 2008, Tundikhel has witnessed a greater constellation of forces -institutional, military, and informal insurgency -competing to establish the sovereign rights to occupy and govern this space. The extent of their control, however, highlights the concurrent identity and political structure of the city, displaying a distinct characteristic of (dis)order. It also manifests the dominant spatial modalities, opening up fresh new insights into public space discourse not only in Nepalese case but also in other cities emerging from similar contexts where public space as an instrument of contestation is transforming into an instrument of domination.
The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, the paper seeks to expand on scholarship from a relatively lesser-known city of the world by presenting an in-depth discussion of Tundikhel, the largest urban public space in Kathmandu. Secondly, the paper examines what I call the 'estranged spatialities' that resulted from three strands of contemporary discourses -institutionalization, militarization, and informalizationcoming together not only to dismantle the very purpose of Tundikhel as a public space but also to rupture the 'space' as we know it. The paper argues that the current public space construct in Kathmandu must be seen as an entanglement of complex, multilayered, and multifaceted conditions, where conflicts come naturally into play, leading to contradictions and estrangement of spaces. The incidence of spatial rupturing has intensified during the political transformation from absolute monarchy to republicanism, signifying new forms of inequality in the public sphere and an affront to the democratic aspirations of the 'New Nepal 2 '.
6 absolute monarchy to democracy or aristocratic dominance to more democratic 'people-centric' regimes.
Each has a story. Each contributes to our understanding of the new spatial and spatiotemporal conditions. Now it should not be thought that the conflation of these three discourses is merely an empirical issue. On the contrary, it has practical political consequences that construct the new 'urbanism' in these cities. They might appear as fragmentary forces, but together they demonstrate multiple spatialities and temporalities within the dynamic city system. The uses of the space are continually shifting and expanding to accommodate constantly changing functions, agencies, and meanings. For example, this happens when agitational campaigns and dharnas against an oppressive political regime are confounded with 'disorder and crime', or when struggle to install the vending barrows by the rural migrants is equated with 'commodification' of space. In both cases, the result is to occlude the question whether to subject public space to the logic of the insurgent urbanism or the state is to promote a freely admissible and a democratic public space. Despite this heterogeneity within the public space and disjunction between various agents and functions, it ultimately functions as a whole and we read it accordingly.
Institutionalization of public space is rooted in the notion that public space is primarily a responsibility of state authority, which engages in its re-appropriation to create order and security (Benjamin, 2008; Mitchell, 1995; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2006) administered through regulations and rights. An institutional framework not only defines boundaries, controls access, and grants publicness but also extends control over public spaces for sovereign rights. Marvin's (2013) analysis of Chinese colonial rule over Tibet describes how sovereign rights are executed through the creation of 'presumptive' spaces, which are not just symbols of restrictions but also the centers of conflict between Chinese authorities and Tibetans who are deprived of any instruments of democracy. For indigenous Tibetans, the use of the public space is related to their 'natural' and 'civil' rights despite being fully aware their most important and holy public space in Barkhor is ringed with surveillance. Likewise, Chinese authorities are aware that they are 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 vulnerable to international criticism if their confrontations with Tibetans catch the attention of international media, revealing the structure of force that represses Tibetan protests and religious activity.
More importantly, it endangers the touristic romance that translates into revenues in Lhasa (Marvin, 2013 (Marvin, :1471 . The enterprising Chinese state sees the space as a potential neoliberal object. This makes
Barkhor a presumptive space with multiple meanings, imaginations, and agencies. Real spaces with ordinary qualities turn into celebratory spaces -a shift from an 'ordinary' to a 'celebratory' or 'cherished'
space -where 'non-ordinary' behavior becomes the norm. In such transition, however, space is usurped by the dominant groups and over time lost from the public domain altogether. Padawangi (2013) laments Jakarta's subjection of public space provision under the authority of the ruling power to turn celebratory spaces of displaying power within the context of a fundamentally unequal society. Such institutional assertiveness is made more complex by the advent of neoliberalism that sees entrepreneurial states altering their modes of operation to become de facto landowners and formidable economic actors looking for ways to re-appropriate the public space for economic gain. The institutional influence on public space appears to hold grounds regardless of nature of the state it is connected to. Especially in countries riddled with conflict such as Nepal the boundary between democracy and autocracy is often blurred and even within the democratic envelope, splinter autocracies appear to exist as certain institutions and organisations can still choose to operate in autocratic ways and vice versa.
Not bound by geography, the expansion of neoliberalization takes its own cultural forms. Hackenbroch (2013) , in her study of access to public space and water supply in Dhaka, describes how poor voters support the formal system to gain political support to produce exclusionary and discriminatory outcomes leading to "organized encroachment of the powerful", represented by the strong network of relations between institutions and individual actors of political society (416) where they all have some neoliberal agenda. This manifests itself in all groups of the society. For the ordinary citizens, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 this 'encroachment' is about gaining access to urban amenities and services, but for institutions, it is about gaining power and political supremacy by controlling access to resources. Interestingly, however, such political inimitability can even produce quasi-state powers 5 to enforce moral and cultural code, as executed by Shiv Sena in Mumbai or the Maoist cadres in Kathmandu, suggesting informality to be inseparable from formality. The profound upheavals that ensue from political struggle quickly raise the prospect of de jure informal insurgency that seeks to counter-balance dominant spatial modalities. In apparent public takeover of space, the post-independence Jakarta witnessed public spaces evolve into 'megaphones' for grass-roots movements (Padawangi, 2013) , while in Bangalore, public space engendered what Benjamin (2008) calls 'occupancy urbanism'. Both underscore powers of informal insurgency in subverting the logic of military urbanism and institutionalized dominance -deemed formalization of space that allows groups to make democratic claims, demands, and protests, where spatialities, sovereignty, and rights are constructed, negotiated, and contested (Dovey, 2001 , Marvin, 2013 . Informality is thus useful because, considered as an active agent in social and physical production, it provides us with the liberating force to enable us to experience public space in alternative ways. People make cities. In such formulation, informality by virtue of being people-driven, is seen as a tool for nonspatial consciousness to the materiality reflecting our inherent humanistic relationship with space (public space) in universal ways.
Owing to the heterogeneity of actions of diverse groups and the difficulty of offering a uniform response, state institutions tend to rely on traditional methods of control and order through both soft and hard 21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 elites in the dominant position. According to him, "the creation or expansion of municipal by-laws targeting the urban poor and informal economy, aggressive enforcement of law and order, and the literal or de facto privatization of public space all contribute to spatial fragmentation and a massive fortification of the spaces between rich and poor" (199) . As an intersection of people and power, public space naturally plays a prominent role in establishing order and paving the way for implanting hard measures that articulate policification and militarization. State institutions enforce regulations and deliver welfare provisions often with support from the police and, in some cases, the military. The massively militarized elections in parts of the global south only corroborate how democratic functions are supported by the military and how they are played out in the public sphere. On the other hand, the logic of state militarization is often situational (effective in certain contexts) and relational (they only exist in opposition to other categories) (Castro, 2013) . For instance, the military has played two important roles in the history of conflict in Nepal. Up until the 1990s, the military played a crucial role in protecting the Royals and royal institutions; however, post-1990s, they helped the state in diffusing the Maoist opposition. Thus, the same agency is seen as having multiple identities and roles in the history. A central paradox, however, is the 'military-encroachment of the public space', as inevitably, the presence of the military in the city embodies transfer of sandbags, check posts and barracks from the borders into the streets and public spaces, creating new frontiers of barriers and divisions. These divisions are both visual and spatial, a common byproduct of persistent political instability. Over time these barriers start to achieve a sense of permanence, with high walls and barbed wires rupturing the space.
Literature is rife with allusions to public space shaped by complex structure and differentiated symbolic discourses. The heuristic intervention of state and military in public spaces is deemed both real (restriction of access, speech, and action in everyday life) and metaphorical (emblematic of the death of the values of free society); the resurgence of grass-roots, be they informal traders or political activists, is beset with realism (livelihood) and idealism (counter-movement). Despite these contributions, the construction of public space in nascent democracies remains unexamined. More importantly, a coherent framework to explain how public space is connected with state spatialities warrants a deeper understanding of the confluence of the three discourses discussed above that position public space at the historic crossroads where the sum of parts is greater than the whole. They comprise, what Bridge and Watson (2010: 371) call, the confluence of the publics and cultures, deeply entwined offering up complex, sometimes conflictual, relationships that define the politics of the urban in general. The three discourses are not mutually exclusive. They are sometimes complementary and sometimes in conflict, and together they create an urban condition that fosters contestation and eventual rupturing. However, what remains unexamined is the eventual rupturing of the space as a result of the modalities of power it helps to sustain.
In order to demonstrate the spatial discourses of power, people, and sovereignty, I shall now focus on Tundikhel in the following section.
Tundikhel: A brief spatial history
The traceable history of Tundikhel goes back to medieval times, when Kathmandu was a mercantile and intellectual center. Anecdotal evidence exists from that ancient period, of Kathmandu being on the trade route between India and Tibet (Shrestha, 1981) (Sengupta and Upadhyay, 2016) . The power of the palace was provided with cultural rationales through the co-option of religious festivals by the royal family (Routledge, 1994) . 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 independent attributed (mainly) to the pressures from donor agencies. In recent years the government has instituted liberal economy and opened up to new investments firmly adopting neoliberal ideals.
Tundikhel thus symbolizes different layers of planning and development achievements of different political periods to which the turn of the century added a new dimension. The struggle for democracy that continued well over a decade saw Tundikhel playing an important role, from being a 'royal ground', it evolved into democracy's 'battleground' where all forms of political power, including military and democratic forces, collide. The exclusionary process of class formation instituted by the 'Royals' and the respect they commanded for centuries was challenged by a defensive informal outbreak. With the ubiquitous media presence capturing the political struggle by transmitting images and actions, Tundikhel's visual and metaphorical appeal as a space of emancipation has surpassed its appeal as a space of grandeur and beauty in the public imagination'. Tundikhel became a public space in a true sense that showed great potential to renew the value of social life quite in line with the Lefebvrian (1991: 38) notion of "lived space as co-created common life". The open field of about 30ha of land sandwiched between the new and old quarters of the city (Figure 1 ) simultaneously became the site for liberation and royalty -a mediator between the power and the powerless. However, the specter of control has never been absent from Tundikhel, reflecting the complex hierarchical socio-economy of the time, on which the fascist regime was run. As argued by Drummond (2000) in her study of public spaces in Vietnam, the country had a little history or concept of public space -it was a social vacuum that had been filled by the authority of the emperor/state with little place for Western-style public discussion or expression. This exclusionary operation was considered an essential mechanism to control the 'public', and exclusions were rooted in the process of class formation 6 . The resultant chaos was of our own imagining -the 13 product of royal or at times the institutional addiction to mechanical order -here we see the order of life in development.
The unmaking of Tundikhel: Ruptured spaces and estranged spatialities
Tundikhel today is the largest civic precinct in Kathmandu, surrounded by some of the busiest routes and Insert Figure 2 the greater mass of Tundikhel. Rai (2002) noted that the historic shrinkage of Tundikhel is striking as space shrank from 60ha to 30ha over the span of 100 years. Segregation and fragmentation are two enduring trends of this transformation, created using both symbolic and physical barriers instituted by wider interventions resulting from institutionalization, militarization, and informalization. These interventions have come together to become a formidable force that breaks the linearity of the space into smaller pockets (see figure 3 ), that are either controlled or out of bounds. They enclose discrete pockets of space introduce relative solidity to the space itself affecting the impression of its orientational thrust.
Institutionalization
Institutionalization provides a framework to bring resources into the public domain. In a regressive step, it can also introduce control, which reverses this process. In an ideal world, institutions provide basic provision in the interests of all citizens (Mitchell, 1995) , closing the gap between the rich and the poor, the privileged and the powerless. In Nepal, historically the state/institution's role has been minimal in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 with the state and its policies manifested in a 'democratic deficit' that Maoists sought to address through the insurgency. While the government response to the insurgency was marked by failure to institutionalize democracy by promoting inclusion, representation, and responsiveness (Thapa and Sharma, 2011), the Maoist insurgency had its own economic cost as the state was forced to redirect resources to fight it at the expense of dwindling resources in developmental areas and political organizations such as Kathmandu Municipality. In recent decades, democratic transition was accompanied by the concept of devolution and self-governance guided by the country's commitment to economic neoliberalism. Donor agencies, which funded up to 30% of the country's budget, insisted on embracing self-sustenance and wider partnership -a transition marked by the adoption of neoliberalist thinking in state institutions that put organizations such as Kathmandu Metropolitan City (KMC) in the spotlight as they increasingly look for ways to strengthen their institutional role and fiscal capacities 7 . The stage was set with the Local Self Governance Act 1999, which provides wider autonomy and a legal framework for the local governments to take various decisions independently in a more enterprising way that apes the market mechanism, particularly in areas of local taxation, parking permits, and licensing.
Buildings and open spaces within the Municipality are seen as bankable assets and an apparatus for maximizing municipal revenue. Not bound by geography, the expansion of neoliberalization has taken its own cultural forms, particularly in a context where there is relative fluidity of the urban condition, and 'surplus' people who are either poor or indifferent to the state. Going by Hindman's (2014) account, Kathmandu's neoliberalism is a 'DIY capitalism' that emerged in the post-conflict society and reflects not the return of the proverbial government intervention but a call to survive on your own. For grass-roots the problem is not conflict, but the effect of conflict on people's lives and livelihood, and a rejection of the state apparatus. The notion of rejection is entrenched in the government machinery as well. The local election has remained suspended for the last 10 years, and as a result, the governing structure in municipal 7 The centrally allocated budget for the KMC has been dwindling in recent years as evident from 22% reduction in 2016-17 (from NRs 4.07 to 3.66 billion) over the previous year. where the state withholds full rights of expression, but conceals this fact for political ends, and power is served by the illusion of public space.
The institutional transgression continued in Ratna Park, which was established some four decades ago, as the only park in the heart of the city. During the conflict period, the park was well used by new migrants and low-income people looking for a place to rest. However, in 2012, KMC abruptly closed the park, citing unauthorized encroachment from informal traders engendering crime and prostitution. What we observed is a new pattern of governance that uses policing and institutional control, not just for reinforcing the historical dimension of 'control' legitimatized on the grounds of urban surveillance but also to achieve economic gain. Samara (2010) asserts that the use of policing under the new neoliberal governance, in which the understanding and practice of security are closely linked to the growth requirements of the market, raises important questions about the rights and citizenship of the people that call the city their home. The economic drive behind the closure of Ratna Park had been known to all 8 .
Accordingly, the park was reopened in August 2015, and in the first month of its reopening KMC collected NRs 700,000 (US$ 6,560) (Ojha, 2015) . This neoliberal interjection brings the park under the exclusive domain of elite residents, excluding the city's poor and informal traders or the homeless creating its own lists of gentries who are worthy to be called 'the public'. Excluded from Ratna Park, the 8 Interview with KMC officials revealed it has also tendered for a construction of an upmarket café with WiFi provisions which are signs of provision geared towards affluent people. anti-social behaviors, however, not only ignores the possibility of self-correction but also prevents other legitimate political, social, and economic functions to take place (Drummond, 2000) . In fact, the statedriven silent closure of public space was a feature of the urban landscape long before the culture of urban surveillance and control began. For instance, Rani Pokhari, built in the 16 th century (Figure 2 ), has remained out of bounds for nearly 100 years, with vertical 10-feet-high iron bars obstructing both view and access. On the pond there is a Shiva temple, a Hindu god in the middle, which is accessed from a bridge many have not crossed in this generation. In a strange paradox, the pond, along with the temple and the deity, remain locked up in a society that is frequently energized through Hindu activism 9 . In a city that is famous for its public baths and Dhunge Dharas 10 , Rani Pokhari remains just a visual treat.
However inexplicable the reasons might be, the century of restrictions in accessing Rani Pokhari has successfully erased a landmark public space from memory.
The institutionalization of parts of Tundikhel offers an insight into power relations that create hierarchical spaces in the society, given that the latter is linked with notions of oppression and domination. Against the backdrop of centuries of autocratic rule, democracy in Kathmandu is in its infancy, and it still borrows from the legacy of the past and is rapidly gaining strength. Strangely enough, everything the state does (or not) is 'Sarkari'-'stately' -in Nepal. A Sarkari kam is a purpose or action that still carries an impression 9 Protests from Hindu activists demanding to declare the country back into a Hindu Nation are common in Kathmandu. Activists frequently clash with Police and the demand has political support from pro-monarchy parties such as Rastriya Prajatantrik Party (Kathmandu . 10 The traceable history of Dhunge Dharas or public baths goes back to 550 AD when Bhairavi, from Lichhavi period, built the first Dhunge Dhara in Hadigaon (Pradhan, 1990) . There are 117 Dhunge Dharas in Kathmandu and another 40 in Patan making them a consistent feature of city's urbanism in the old city quarters.
of being above the law, and this has changed very little in post-conflict Kathmandu.
Militarization
Tundikhel's first spatial militarist was the legendary General Bhimsen Thapa 11 . It is said that he had The militarization of public space in Kathmandu is a hard reality, legitimatized through the historical association of ruling monarchs with the city's cultural practices and rituals, making military presence in the neighborhood a common sight. The aspects of royalty and security featured rather strongly in residents' psyche. The current debate on civilian supremacy over military is the result of the military's controversial history in curbing democracy 12 (Pathak and Uprety, 2011 The fact that militarization embodies imposition of controls using physical features such as barbed wire and high fences sets itself distinctively apart from, let's say, the normative control administered by KMC, discussed in the previous section. The military's heuristic control and expansion in Tundikhel suggest that hegemony and political subjugation remains alive in public spaces of nascent democracies. The magnitude of military controlled parts of Tundikhel has doubled in the span of the last two decades (see Figure 3 ) and now exceeds one-third of Tundikhel. It began with the establishment of army headquarters in the 1980s in the southernmost part of Tundikhel, and subsequently the city witnessed a gradual encroachment of Tundikhel by the army, using clever designations. The spaces went through a transition of being army sports and training grounds, and ultimately the location for new buildings effectively to a muted opposition. In an effort to permanently seize the space, the army has constructed new extensions to its headquarters in Tundikhel, exploiting the loopholes in the legal system. Under the Nepalese law, state 13 The Organization and Association (Control) Act, 1962, proscribed political parties, demonstrations, political meetings, public expression, and the publication of articles. Offenders could be imprisoned for up to three years. The Police Organization Act provided the police with wide powers of arrest, search, and detention, and the Press Act banned the independent media and brought the news media under government control (Baral, 1977) . Baneshwor (now the seat of the Constituent Assembly) was built, relocating the army cantonment. This question points towards the classic feature of military existence that is beset with contradictions. The important role the army has played in counterinsurgency and subsequently internal domestic conflict between those still hung up on the historical legacy (pro-monarchy) and everyone else (anti-monarchy) has led to the army seeing itself playing a prominent role in Nepalese society. On one hand, rebel infiltration continues to pose threats to Kathmandu, and on the other, frequent enforcement of emergency laws, restriction of freedom of movement, etc. have legitimatized the army's penetration into public spaces. In response to the Maoist insurgents using key urban spaces as a material location for hegemonic claims, the army saw the occupation of central areas as being equally important to retain its own symbolic supremacy. Routledge (2010 Routledge ( : 1296 , in his study of urban protest and democracies in Nepal, asserts that public space is a more hybrid version of the civil society that incorporates elements of both liberal and radical democracy -an integral part of the state and a sphere of hegemony, wherein consent is manufactured (albeit through extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions, and constantly changing processes).
The severity of power split and its manifestation in public space in Kathmandu could not be fully comprehended if the historic power of the military was not taken into consideration in the public space discourse. The whole political history of Nepal since medieval times until the abolition of the monarchy Padawangi (2013) , in discussing urban activism, states that Jakarta's Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, which has been the site for public rallies or demonstrations, has been regularly subject to militarization in order to prevent the 'unwanted people' from demonstrating there, particularly during the New Order. Thus, the subjection of public space provision under the authority of the ruling power makes those spaces more prone to becoming celebratory spaces of power and wealth in an unequal society.
In addition to being 'politically-led', the army's current role in the socio-political setting in Nepal and its resistance to any diffusion of power should also be seen as being 'neoliberal-led'. In the recent decade, (Bhandari, 2014) . This puts the army into the same existential dilemma as a poorly managed state enterprise searching for new ways to survive. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 Informality in public space is a claim-making process and can be characterized as an eruption of informal activities that can range from informal trading and homeless people living on the streets or public spaces to cars and vehicles parked under the Municipality's 'No parking' sign. They could also be impromptu sports activities or a range of other activities lacking any designated space. In most cities of the global south, informality regularly intersects with formality. For instance, it is completely accepted that the 'formal' use of spaces is controlled to introduce a series of other (informal) activities (political rallies), functions (informal trading zones), or religious parades (such as Durga puja in Kolkata, Gai Jatra in Kathmandu, and Ganapati Bappa in Mumbai) for which state institutions do not allocate formal space.
Thus, the 'laws of people' take precedence over the 'institutional laws' as guardians of these public spaces. Ultimately, in the global south, the publicness of its cities and spaces is measured from the extent, efficiency, and effectiveness of these crossovers.
In Kathmandu, there are no designated public spaces, but any space that is not privately owned is called and Janik means 'people' in English, so any space that is accessible to all people is actually Sarvajanik,
or Sarvajanik sthala -a place that is 'accessible to all'. Publicly owned land and spaces tend to be above the law in Nepal, and all, in their capacity as users, are "citizens" and have the same rights over the space.
The occupation of such space, by ordinary people, goes beyond the mere behavioral response to the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 right through the 1990s, the city saw the Panchayati 15 regime allowing an explosion of informal markets as a mechanism to curb political discontentment brewing under the covert operations of Maoist soldiers.
Subsequently, a large swathe of Khula Manch turned into a thriving flea market that catered not just to the crowd gathered for political assemblies but also to the wider public. These markets were fostered under the controlled conditions of the Municipality and in tandem with the democratic movement that revolves around occupancy. The occupancy refers to not just physical space but, as Benjamin (2013: 724) argues, "is an appropriation of spaces through the 'embedding' of municipal government into popular society.
Such practices fuel an autonomous political process at the municipal level that reflects a new alliance and coalition politics". 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 They should not be evicted without a long-term alternative" (Kathmandu Post, 2014) . Thus, informality is increasingly a formidable contender for the public space within the contested dimension, operating in close entanglement with statutory institutions. Situated at the verge of legality, informality is constantly intertwined with the Municipal law and is at the discretion of the political, institutional, or military power.
In a strange paradox, KMC is yet to devise a policy on the use of, or what can be accommodated in, the public space and very often, operate in an ad hoc manner 18 . Arguably, in Kathmandu, informality is understood not just as a mode of the 'ordinary', but it has equally accommodated an elite informality carried out often in complicity with statutory institutions.
Urban rupturing: (un)making of public space
Democracy or lack of it is manifested in the city's public spaces. In the process of restoring democracy in Nepal, the city has moved from war to peace, from monarchy to republicanism, from being a Hindu state to secularism and from a unitary to potentially a federal state in the last two decades (Jha, 2016) . This Since public space is never homogeneous, "the dimensions and extent of its publicness are highly differentiated from instance to instance" (Smith and Low, 2006: 3) and require wider study. Our study shows that together these processes point to the complexity around Tundikhel's transformation that 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 is not easily explained by individual perspective. This complexity relates not only to the specific and limited form of democracy that prevails in Tundikhel but also to how a differentiated power structure is determining access and control, staking claims, disrupting activities, and ultimately rupturing the space.
The forces at play are both individual and institutional, formal and informal, civil and military. As a contemporary urban space that enables the contestation of power relations (Routledge, 1994 (Routledge, , 2010 , Tundikhel has become a physical space that itself is being contested.
The paper argues that the confluence of the three dominant modalities of power results in what I call 'spatial estrangement' -a process of (un)making of public spaces through 'urban rupturing'. The evolution of 'rupturing' is evident first in the 'fragmentation' of public space, both physical and symbolic.
Today, only one-sixth of Tundikhel is open to the public (see Figure 3) , while other pockets of Tundikhel remain symbolic sterile spaces, under either institutional or military control. Barbed wire, high iron gates, army patrols, and Municipal wardens create boundaries and prevent access. It is no longer a pure, autonomous repository of power, people, or institutions but instead divided with boundaries and infested with significant apathy among the city's informal groups that are forced to sit just outside the boundary.
These spaces are adorned with hard boundaries that are quite defensive and lacking in civic engagement,
showing the state's approach to treating public space in the same way as buildings or objects -assigning territories and boundaries that ignore the culturally shaped organic relations that existed for centuries. Sennett's (2006) explanation to define edges is pertinent here, which states that they are of two kindsboundaries and borders. A boundary is an edge where things end; a border is an edge where different groups interact. At borders, organisms become more interactive, porous membranes, due to the meeting of different species or physical conditions. A boundary is a guarded territory where no transgression takes place. Tundikhel witnessed borders morphing into boundaries to compartmentalize the space into six pockets of various degree of control that are both political and institutional. Ironically, these boundaries, once the hallmark of the conflict period, are being naturalized. The army's constant presence generates 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 fear, dominating both public space and the everyday life of civilians. Paradoxically, on one hand, the new government-translated democratic ideas are embodied in swatantra-sarbajanik (which translates as freedom-public) dialectic, and on the other, they reproduce the authoritarian state's administrative habits and procedures (particularly from the time of the absolute monarchy) to realize law and order through the army. Current democratic deliberation pays a great deal of attention to controlling, dividing, and ruling but overlooks the balance between good governance and authority.
Beyond fragmentation, there are efforts to assign a sense of 'permanence' that takes the 'rupturing process' to the next level. By allocating specific use(s) and erecting structures, the 'publicness' is permanently taken away from Tundikhel, restricting social interaction, constraining individual liberties, and excluding the public, or public activities. The apparent imperviousness and impermeability across different pockets create spaces with new spatial identities that set them apart from the historic Tundikhel, which was 'one large space'. A large part of Tundikhel is already built up by the Nepalese Army, while in recent years new elitist outfits such as Hindu religious groups have built permanent structures. A creeping elitism in public space resonates Hackenbroch's (2013) 'organised encroachment' for which state colludes with institutions that may not always have the public interest in mind. Further, the neoliberal ambition of the current government (from the state's claims in ownership to introduction of entry fee in Ratna Park) reproduces that class hierarchy and governs who is allowed access and who is denied it. Thus, at the mezzanine level of the confluence of the triumvirate, we observe a tension between the formal regime and informality, a battle of access and privilege and luxury and livelihood. Ultimately, this urban rupturing points to the possible disconnection of Tundikhel from the city, its history, and wider culture. This ongoing process has the power to erase the history and legacy of the space from the public memory such that the public space is not recognizable anymore. These phenomena are manifested by 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 different multiple actions: eradication of structure/ buildings, adding fences, and changing activities. The prolonged imposition of 'control' is, therefore, a condition, which leads to an urban amnesia towards the city's history. In Tundikhel, Rani Pokhari's access restriction and muted opposition epitomizes how spatial rupturing leads to the material deletion of public space from the public mind. The amnesia is all the more troubling since its mutilations are ignored and its role in the city's urbanism rapidly loses relevance. Tundikhel was originally three miles in length and 300 yards in width, spreading from Rani
Pokhari to Dasharath Stadium. Major parts of Tundikhel are now permanently lost through various developments and ever widening perimeter roads, barriers, and iron gates restricting access and rupturing the space. Ironically, space has shrunk by more than half in just 40 years, a fact that is deleted from the minds of the generation that is old enough to remember the past.
To conclude, the paper informs the current debates on whether the public space in global south is quintessentially public. It argues that Tundikhel remains tightly controlled by the interplay of the three dominant modalities of power, and this in part reflects the traditional social values and notions that uphold denial, restriction, and oppression in the use of public space. The paper advocates that judging by the ambition, depth, and extent of impact, the confluence of dominant modalities of power assumes a hegemonic character powerful enough to trigger fundamental shifts in the processes and relationships through which public space is fragmented, modified, and eventually deleted from the memory -a phenomenon of urban rupturing. The paper contends that hypocrisy is inherent in the public space agenda in Kathmandu witnessed through a gradual decline in the publicness of Tundikhel amid organized claims and interventions borne out of an urban condition that not only maligns the public space agenda but also creeps into other spheres of urban development. Finally, this empirical study exposes the limits to the specific form of democracy that people enjoy (or suffer) in contemporary Kathmandu. Perhaps it also 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
